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ABSTRACT
In Lane v. Franks, the U.S. Supreme Court held that public employees
who give truthful testimony in court are protected so long as it was outside
their ordinary job duties.1 This issue arose after ten years of the Garcetti
rule which does not protect employee speech pursuant to their job duties- a
nebulous topic in the digital era.2 In applying Garcetti, lower courts have
extended it to include any speech that is a product of job duties, even if it
would serve the public interest.3 In Lane v. Franks, the Court amended the
employee speech doctrine to protect subpoenaed testimony that is outside
the employee’s job duties.4 This article applauds the new exception, but argues that the Court’s ruling was too narrow. Using the principles espoused
in the case, this article argues that the Court should have amended the
Garcetti rule and refocused the test on the public trust rather than the employee-employer relationship.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, two disparate conflicts arising from public employee speech
were in the news. The first story was about Jason Jackler, a probationary
officer in Middletown, New York.5 He had been present during an arrest
when a fellow officer assaulted a suspect who was in handcuffs.6 Jackler
followed protocol and reported what he had witnessed.7 However, in the
department’s attempt to cover-up the abuse, Jackler was pressured by his
superiors to withdraw the statement.8 When Jackler refused to do so, he was
summarily fired.9
The second story was the story Andrew Shirvell who worked as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Michigan.10 Shirvell went on social

1

Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006)
3 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376.
4 Id. at 2374 –75.
5
Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 2011).
6
Id. at 230.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 231.
9
Id. at 231-32.
10
See Tim Martin, Andrew Shirvell, Mich Asst. AG Accused of Harassing Student, Fired, HUFFINGTON
POST, May 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/08/andrew-shirvell-mich-asst_n_780587
2
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media and attacked the student body president of the University of Michigan for being gay.11 The comments went viral and created a media firestorm.12 Shirvell was soon after fired for his comments.9
In both cases, the employee sued for retaliation based upon protected
speech.13 At the trial court level, one of the individuals won his case and the
other lost when the courts applied the public employee speech doctrine.14
Jackley, who had refused to lie in an official report in order to cover up
agency abuse, lost his case because he was considered to be speaking within
his official duties.15 Shirvell, who spewed hatred toward a class of people
he was charged with protecting, won his case because he was not speaking
pursuant to his official duties.16 Eventually, on appeal, both decisions were
reversed, but not after thousands of dollars were spent, and personal and
professional lives were devastated. 17
Public employee speech on matters of public concern is an essential
component to the freedom of speech.18 Public employees have a privileged
insight into the inner workings of our government policy and its implementation, including instances of gross mismanagement, abuse, or criminal
wrongdoing.19 Because of this position, public employees have the unique

.html.
Id.
12
The Michigan Attorney General’s Office received over 20,000 complaints. See Ed White, Shirvell’s
Anti-Gay Rants Not Protected, Court Says, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 10, 2015, http://www.freep.com
/story/news/local/michigan/2015/01/10/anti-gay-attorney-appeal/21549113.
13
See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011); Shirvell v. Dep’t of Attorney Gen., 866 N.W.2d
478 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
14 See Jackler v. Byrne, 708 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Shirvell v. Dep’t of Attorney Gen., 866
N.W.2d 478 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
15
See Jackler v. Byrne, 708 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
16
Shirvell was a matter of public concern. See Shirvell v. Dep’t of Attorney Gen., 866 N.W.2d 706, 735
(Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
17
See Jackler, 658 F.3d at 228 (2d Cir. 2011). Cf. Bowie v. Maddox (Bowie II), 653 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (holding that employee termination based upon her refusal to testify falsely in favor of his
employer was not protected because it was within her job duties to testify) (“[T]he illegality of a government employer's order does not necessarily mean the employee has a cause of action under the First
Amendment when he contravenes that order.”).
18
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2373–83 (2014) (holding that a public employee’s truthful testimony
compelled by subpoenaed and outside the of ordinary job duties is protected by the First Amendment).
19
E.g. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., BLOWING THE WHISTLE: BARRIERS TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
MAKING DISCLOSURES 4 (2011), http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=662503
&version=664475 (referencing a 2010 survey of 40,000 federal workers, 11.1% of respondents claimed
to have observed wasteful activity in their agency within the last 12 months); ETHICS RES. CTR.,
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF PUBLIC SECTOR ETHICS 1-2 (2008),
http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowersdocuments/ethicsresourcecentersuvery.pdf (refer11
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ability to inform the public and help the public hold the government accountable.20 Ten years ago, the United States Supreme Court narrowed protection for public employees, offering no First Amendment protection when
the employee spoke pursuant to his or her job duties.21 The Garcetti rule
exempting speech made “pursuant to his or her job duties”22 was meant to
create a bright-line rule as to when an employee is not protected. But in the
current work environment, ‘job duties’ is a nebulous concept and has only
made it more difficult for public employees to discern if they have any free
speech protection.23 Lower courts have extended this exception greatly and
in many cases where employee speech would be in the public interest, the
speech is not protected.24 Essentially, public employees now give up their
free speech rights when they take employ with the government,25 and it is
the public that pays the price.26
In the recent case of Lane v. Franks, the U.S. Supreme Court did not address the Garcetti dilemma. Instead the Court created only a narrow exception for when employees truthfully testify in court.27 This exception is laudable and a step in the right direction, but the court did not answer the
fundamental problems with the public employee speech doctrine, postGarcetti.28
Accordingly, this article examines the Court’s most recent public employee speech case and argues that the Court should revisit the Garcetti
rule. First, the article outlines the case of Lane v. Franks and the new exception to the Garcetti rule.29 Then the article discusses the public employee
speech doctrine and the narrowing of protection for public employee speech

encing a study that found nearly 60% of public employees surveyed had claimed to witness at least one
incident of mismanagement in the last 12 months).
20
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) (holding that teachers who are informed about
school funding are essential to the public debate on the matter).
21
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that speech made pursuant to official job
duties did not receive First Amendment protection).
22
Id. at 423.
23
See discussion infra Part III.C.
24
See discussion infra Part III.C.
25
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
26
See discussion infra Part III.C; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
the ruling “provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly
to their superiors,” the opposite of what is meant to balance free speech with government efficiency).
27
See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378–79 (2014).
28
See discussion infra Part IV.
29
See discussion infra Part II.
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on matters of public concern after Garcetti.30 Finally, the article argues that
the principles espoused in Lane point toward a need to modify Garcetti further and offers a new legal test for public employee speech.31
II. THE TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY EXCEPTION: LANE V. FRANKS
Edward Lane worked for Central Alabama Community College (CACC)
as its Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY).32 He
oversaw the operations of the program including hiring and firing and decisions regarding its finances.33 The program had significant financial difficulties, so Lane decided to audit it.34 The audit revealed that an employee
who was on the CITY payroll as a counselor was not reporting to her job.35
Lane reported this issue to the president of CACC and its counsel and told
them that he wanted to fire the employee.36 The president and council
warned against it, fearing that it would have negative repercussions on the
organization and Lane—as the counselor in question was also an Alabama
State Representative.37
Nonetheless, Lane moved forward and contacted the Representative and
told her that she had to report her job, but she refused to do so.38 Subsequently, Lane fired the employee.39 The Representative’s termination
prompted an FBI investigation into her employment with the organization.40
As a result, Lane was subpoenaed to appear in front of a grand jury to testify as to why he fired the Representative.41
The grand jury eventually indicted the Representative on charges of mail
fraud and theft concerning a program that receives federal funding.42 She

30

See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
32
See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. (stating that Lane worked with underprivileged youth in the CITY Program).
33
Id. (noting that Lane was hired on a probationary basis).
34
Id.
35
See id.
36 Id.
37
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. The Alabama State Representative was named Suzanne Schmitz. Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. (indicating that the representative told another CITY that she was going to get back at Lane by
denying any money requests that the organization made to the legislature).
40
Id.
41 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375.
42
U.S. v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1256–1257 (11th Cir. 2011).
31
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had allegedly collected over $175,000 of federal funds, though she had not
performed any tasks.43 During the trial, Lane was again subpoenaed to testify.44 The Representative was eventually found guilty on all but one count
and she was sentenced to 30 months in prison and to pay back all funds she
received.45
During the legal proceedings for the Representative, Franks had become
the president of CACC.46 Lane remained with the CITY program, but the
organization continued to have financial difficulties.47 As a result, Lane
recommended to Franks that he make layoffs.48 Franks took the advice and
terminated 29 probationary employees- including Lane.49 Franks eventually
rescinded all but 2 of the terminations,50 with Lane’s termination remaining
in effect.51 Franks justified Lane’s termination by arguing that Lane was a
member of management, not an hourly employee.52
Lane sued Franks in federal court alleging “retaliation for his testimony
against [the Representative].”53 The District Court granted Franks’ summary judgement.54 The court applied the Garcetti rule and held that Franks
had qualified immunity from damages because “a reasonable government
official in his position would not have had reason to believe that the Constitution protected [Lane’s] testimony.”55 The court argued that Lane was act-

43

See generally Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375 (noting that a jury failed to reach a verdict in Schmitz’s first
trial, at which Lane testified, and Schmitz was retried six months later, at which Lane was again subpoenaed to testify); Id. at 1256-1257.
44
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375.
45
Id. at 2375; Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1258 (sentencing Schmitz to thirty months’ imprisonment on each
count of conviction, to run concurrently, for a total of thirty months and ordering Schmitz to pay restitution in the amount of $177,251.82).
46 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376 (stating that Steven Franks became president of CACC in January 2008).
47
Id.
48 Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376 (noting that Franks rescinded the terminations of the other employees “because of an ‘ambiguity in [those other employees’] probationary service”).
52
Id. at 2376 (noting that Franks claimed that he did not rescind Lane’s termination because Lane was a
managerial employee and not an hourly employee, who cannot be terminated without cause. The CITY
program was subsequently eliminated, all employees were let go, and Franks retired).
53
Id. at 2376; see id. at 2376 n.2 (noting that Lane also brought suit under a state whistleblower statute,
ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (2013)).
54
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2372.
55 Id. at 2376 (applying Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410).
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ing within his official duties because he had learned the information while
working for CITY.56
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the ruling stating that even if the
speech is not required as part of his official duties, the speech is a product
of his official duties.57 The court held that Lane’s speech was about his investigation of the Representative while he was her supervisor, thus it was a
product of his official duties.58 Lane then appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court which granted certiorari.59
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected public
employees from retaliation when they were subpoenaed to testify and provide truthful information, if it was outside the course of their ordinary job
duties.60 In its analysis, the Court applied the public employee speech doctrine. First, it examined whether court testimony in a case of federal fraud
against a state representative is “a matter of public concern.”61 The Court
said that sworn testimony is the “quintessential” form of speaking as a citizen and is independent of an employee’s obligation to his or her employer.62
To illustrate the point, the Court cited the federal perjury statute: “Anyone
who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large,
to tell the truth.”63
Next, the Court examined whether the speech was pursuant to the job duties.64 The Court clarified the Garcetti rule stating that “speech that simply
relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the course
of public employment”65 is not necessarily free from protection. The crux of
the Garcetti rule is that speech falls within a person’s job duties, not that the
speech is a product of a person’s job duties.66 The Court then distinguished

56

See id.
Id. at 2372.
58
Id.
59 See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.
60
Id. at 2369, 2377 (stating that the lower courts have been divided, and that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, resolving the issue on whether public employees may suffer adverse employment consequences for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony).
61
See id. at 2379 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1623, which criminalizes false statements under oath, and elaborating on how this applies to Lane).
62 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
63 See id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See id.
57
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Lane’s case from Garcetti v. Ceballos. In Garcetti, the employee prepared
an internal memo which he was paid to do.67 Lane was testifying in court,
which was “outside the scope of his ordinary job duties.”68 Finally, the
Court examined whether the government employer had a legitimate reason
for treating the employee differently than an ordinary citizen.69 The Court
referred back to Connick v. Myers70 and stated that “a stronger showing [of
government interests] may be necessary if the employee’s speech more substantially involve[s] matters of public concern.”71 The Court held that the
government employer showed no evidence that Lane’s testimony contained
sensitive information or was not truthful.72 Thus, the Court overturned the
Eleventh Circuit’ ruling and created a narrow exception for truthful testimony compelled by subpoena that is outside the employee’s ordinary job
duties.73
III. EVOLUTION OF THE EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE
Traditionally, public employees had no job protection and could be fired
at will.74 Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed the view of the judiciary of the
era: “a policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.”75 Essentially, the government forced
employees to trade their constitutional rights for their jobs.76 There was a
constitutional right to free speech, but no constitutional right to work for the
government.77

67

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2374–75 (2014).
69
Id. at 2380 (holding that an assistant district attorney’s questionnaire about workplace satisfaction was
not speech on a matter of public concern) (internal citations omitted).
70 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (2016).
71
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381.
72
Id. (dealing with qualified immunity for Franks and holding that since no courts had ruled on this issue, Franks could not have been aware of the Lane’s protection, thus he had qualified immunity. The
Court upheld the 11th Circuit’s decision).
73
See id. at 2383.
74
Connick, 461 U.S. at 183. “[T]he unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to
object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.” Id.
75
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892) (holding that a police officer could
not be fired for joining political activist group).
76
See id.
77
Alder v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (“We think that a municipal employer is not disabled
because it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its employees as to matters that may prove relevant
to their fitness and suitability for the public service.”); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Los Angeles, 341
68
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1. EXPANDING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH PROTECTION
Through the 1950s, government employees had absolutely no free speech
protections, including being forced to sign ‘loyalty oaths,’ stating that they
were not Communists, as a condition of employment.78 A line of United
States Supreme Court cases in the 1960s overturned state statutes that required loyalty oaths as a condition of employment, and for the first time the
Court recognized public employees maintained a right to free speech.79 In
1968, the United State Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the
government’s desire for efficiency and the bureaucrat’s dual role as citizen
and employee. In Pickering v. Board of Education, a public school teacher
was fired for writing a letter that criticized the school board’s managing of
financial resources.80 The Court held that without proof that the statements
were false, the teacher could not be dismissed from public employment for
making comments of public concern.81 The Court noted that public employees do not give up their First Amendment rights when they take a government position.82
In Pickering, the Court forwarded a balancing test for employee speech:
the interests of government employees (commenting on matters of public
concern) must be balanced against the interests of the government employer
(promoting efficiency of public services).83 The Court found that school financing was a matter of public concern on which the teacher could speak
informatively.84 Furthermore, her letter was not person specific, thus, daily
school operations would not be affected.85 The Court also rejected the gov-

U.S. 716, 719 (1951) (stating the city could require its employees to divulge past or present membership
in the Communist Party).
78
See Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public
Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 44 n.10 (1988).
79
See generally Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Cramp v. Bd. Of Pub. Instruction, 368
U.S. 278 (1961); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
The following year, the Court used similar language to protect the political speech of high school students. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.”).
80 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
81 Id. at 574.
82 Id.
83 Id.at 568.
84 Id. at 569–70.
85 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 569–70 (1968).
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ernment’s argument that the teacher had a working relationship with the
school board that required loyalty.86
The concept of a public employee speaking on a matter of public concern
was not new to the high court. In Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court used this
analysis to overturn defamation charges against a state attorney general who
had called a panel of judges ‘lazy.’87 The Court argued that the judges’ truancy had been the cause of a great backlog of cases and it was a matter of
public concern.88 In Wood v. Georgia, the Court used the same legal concept to overturn a contempt charge against a sheriff who was reprimanded
for criticizing a racist judge’s grandstanding in court for political gain.89
Over the next twenty years, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to apply
the Pickering test in favor of free speech rights. In Perry v. Sindermann,90 a
college professor at a Texas public junior college had picketed to have the
college become a four year institution.91 He was subsequently fired by the
administration for his actions.92 The Court held that despite being on a one
year contract, renewal could not be denied based solely upon the employee’s speech on a matter of public concern.93 In Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist, a Mississippi teacher was fired after he went to the principal’s private office to complain about the alleged racist policies of the
school district.94 The Court held that public employees do not lose their
constitutionally protected speech rights when they communicate with their
employer privately.95
In Rankin v. McPherson, the plaintiff, considered an officer of the law,
upon hearing of the attempted assassination of President Reagan, told a coworker that if there was another attempt, she hoped that “they get him.”96

86

Id. at 570.
See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
88 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962))(“[S]tatements … on matters of public concern must be accorded First
Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements are directed at their nominal superiors.”).
89
See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
90 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
91
Id. at 595.
92
Id.
93
See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996) (extending this protection to include
independent contractors hired by the government); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596
(1972).
94 See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
95
Id. at 415–16.
96
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381 (1987).
87
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The co-worker reported the comments to the officer’s supervisor and the
speaker was subsequently fired.97 The Court held that an employee’s free
speech protection includes controversial topics and reversed the decision.98
While these cases show the Pickering test allowed the courts to expand protected speech for public employees, the Court would soon rein in the scope
of protected speech.
2. NARROWING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH PROTECTION
In Connick v. Myers,99 assistant district attorney Myers had worked in
the office for many years.100 Connick had been recently elected to be attorney general and decided to reorganize the office.101 Myers circulated a flyer
claiming that the reorganization was politically motivated.102 Connick felt
the flyer was insubordination and fired her.103 Myers brought suit believing
that she was fired for exercising her free speech rights.104
In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim of free
speech protection,105 and modified the Pickering test. The new legal test became: 1.) the employee must demonstrate that the speech was a matter of
public concern. If that is not affirmed, then 2.) the government employer
must establish the speech was also disruptive to the operation.106 The Court
stated that in order to decide whether speech is on a matter of public concern, a court must examine “content, form and context” of the speech.107 In
Connick, the Court held that the employee failed on the first prong of the
test as the flyer did not contain speech on a matter of public concern.108

97

Id. at 381–382.
See id. at 392, 384 (“Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over
employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors
disagree with the content of employee’s speech.”).
99
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
100
Id. at 140.
101
See id. at 140–141.
102
Id. at 141.
103
Id.
104
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983).
105
Id. at 139.
106
See id. at 152–154.
107
Id. at 147–48.
108
Id. at 147 (“We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.”).
98
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In Waters v. Churchill,109 an employer overheard a nurse make a negative comment about the public hospital at which she worked. The nurse was
fired for her speech, despite the fact that what she said was in dispute.110
The Court determined that an employee can be terminated if an employer
had a ‘good faith’ belief that he or she actually made the comments.111
However, the burden of proof rests upon the government to show ‘good
faith.’112 In San Diego v. Roe, a police officer sued for retaliation after he
had been fired for selling a homemade sex video in which he appeared
dressed as a police officer.113 The officer claimed that he could not be fired
for speech that he made during his own time and not pertaining to his job.114
The Court disagreed and held that this speech was related to his job and was
detrimental to the department.115 The modification of the Pickering test in
Connick marked the end of broad speech protections for public employees
and ushered in a more narrow interpretation of First Amendment protection
for public employee speech. The Court would modify the rule of law even
further in Garcetti v. Ceballos.
3. JOB DUTIES THRESHOLD: GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS
Ceballos was the supervising district attorney in the Los Angeles (CA)
County Office.116 His duties required him to review prosecutions pursued
by the office.117 Ceballos reviewed an affidavit from the Sheriff about a
search and found flaws in the document.118 He reported his findings in a
memo to the District Attorney and alleged wrongdoing by the Sheriff.119
The District Attorney ignored Ceballos’ memo and continued the prosecution and the trial court decided to let in the evidence recovered by the Sheriff.120 Subsequently, Ceballos was demoted.121 Ceballos claimed that he
was demoted because of his speech in the memo and sued the county for

109

Waters v. Churchill 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
Id. at 666.
111
Id. at 677.
112
See id.
113 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004).
114
Id. at 79–80.
115
Id. at 81.
116
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
117
Id. at 413–14.
118
Id. at 414.
119
Id. at 414.
120
Id. at 414–15.
121
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415 (2006).
110
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violating his free speech rights.122
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that Ceballos’ free speech
rights were not violated because he made his remarks in his official capacity as an employee, and employees do “not speak[ ] as citizens for First
Amendment purposes.”123 Justice Kennedy noted that “[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.”124 The person is no longer acting as a citizen
as he or she is now a paid employee.125 Nonetheless, public employees still
retain broader rights of free speech outside the scope of employment.126
Garcetti modified the public employee speech doctrine so that before the
content of the speech is analyzed to determine if it is a matter of public concern, courts must first examine whether the speaker was acting within his or
her official duties.127 If an employee speaks in his or her official capacity,
then there is no First Amendment protection.128 Note, the courts have not
clearly defined the scope of employ, but listed job duties has often been
cited.129
If the employee was not speaking pursuant to his or her job duties, then
courts are to apply the Pickering/Connick test. So, if the employee’s speech
is not a matter of public concern, then there is no First Amendment protection.130 Public concern is usually determined in a case-by-case basis, but
past examples have pertained to systemic behaviors in an agency, such as
discrimination or corruption.131 If the speech is of public concern, then it
may be protected. This type of speech may include content that is offensive

122

Id. at 415.
Id. at 421.
124 Id. at 418.
125
Id. at 418–19 (“[G]overnment offices could not function if every employment decision became a
constitutional matter.” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
126
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
127
Id. at 418.
128
Id.
129
Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 212–13 (2008). (noting that the Court in Garcetti presented several phrases that may describe the term “employee,” including “professional responsibilities,”
“professional capacity,” “performing . . . job duties,” “tasks . . . paid to perform,” “official duties,” “official responsibilities,” and “employment duties.”).
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and speech from private conversations.132
Only if the above tests are met does a court compare the interests of the
employer with the importance of the speech.133 For example, speech pertaining to whistle blowing would usually outweigh any government interest
(and is statutorily protected in 49 states and the Federal Government).134 In
this step, a court will look at the context of the speech to evaluate if the
time, place or manner of the speech disrupted the employer’s objective.135
Examples of disruptions include impairing the harmony among co-workers,
impairing necessitated loyalty, or interfering with operations.136
An employee’s speech on a matter of public concern can be reprimanded,
without First Amendment implication, so long as the punishment is not a
discharge, demotion or transfer.137 Additionally, if the speech of public concern is only one component that led to the punishment, and the government
can show that the employee would have been fired absent the speech, then
there is no First Amendment claim.138
4. GARCETTI DILEMMA: PROTECTING EMPLOYER RETALIATION
Since Garcetti, lower courts have used the ‘scope of employment’ prong
extensively.139 The most difficult application of this prong are cases where
job descriptions are not well defined.140 But, if courts can find the speech
has the slightest connection to job duties, then the plaintiff rarely pre-
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134 See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of ‘Efficiency,’ 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 17, 68 (1996).
135 Connick, 428 U.S. at 153.
136 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974).
137 See Hudson, supra note 131 at 32.
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Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977) (holding that the government
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have come to the same decision to
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Thomas Keenan, Circuit Court Interpretations of Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Development of Public Employee Speech, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 842 (2011) (noting that circuit courts held “concluding that an employee's speech falls within or without his or her official duties has become an indeterminate affair.”). See generally Mary L. Conrow, Managing Municipal Employee and Employer Rights
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vails.141 The following cases blur the already uncertain line between what is
in public interest and what is managerial prerogative.
a. Law Enforcement Cases
The Southern District of New York upheld the termination of a safety officer that was disciplined for writing a report detailing health and environmental threats to the community.142 The court held that since employee was
the precinct’s safety officer, his reports were within his official duties.143 In
Ohio, the federal court upheld the termination of a police officer that was
fired for complaining about cuts in canine-training.144 The court held that,
as chief canine officer, his complaint was within his official duties.145 In
Maryland, one federal court upheld the firing of a police chief, who while
off-duty but at the station, had sent an e-mail to the mayor complaining
about misuse of fleet vehicles.146 The court determined the off-duty email
was a continuation of an earlier discussion about the fleet that was under his
command and therefore within the scope of his employment.147 The majority of post-Garcetti cases involving law enforcement have held that investigations of misconduct are part of law enforcement’s job and thus any related speech is not protected.148
b. Speech Through Official Channels
The Tenth Circuit upheld the termination of a superintendent of schools
who reported to the school board violations of state and federal law in the
Head Start program.149 The superintendent also instructed subordinates to
report the violations.150 The court reasoned that supervising the Head Start
program was within the superintendent’s job duties.151 However, the court
determined the superintendent’s speech to the District Attorney about the
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school board’s violation of open meeting laws was protected because it was
outside of her job duties.152
The Tenth Circuit also upheld a city council’s termination of police officers who had reported that the police chief had improperly influenced
criminal charges against family and friends to disappear.153 The officers had
first reported the misconduct to a union representative who then reported it
to the state attorney general’s office.154 The court held that it was part of the
officers’ job duties to report to the attorney general’s office, thus they were
speaking within their official capacity and not protected.155 If an employee’s job duties requires he or she to report to officials, the speech will
not be protected even if it serves the public interest.
c. Speech Concerning Public Safety
The Seventh Circuit held that a prison guard was speaking in her official
capacity when she reported to her supervisor that colleagues were possibly
smuggling contraband, since her job duties included prison security.156
Therefore, she could not proceed on a retaliation charge against her internal
transfer.157 The Eastern District Court of Michigan upheld the termination
of an employee that complained to a county labor relations director about a
co-worker’s safety violation.158 The plaintiff had already reported to her
employer about the safety violations and stated that she believed the employee would not be punished because that employee was having an affair
with the supervisor.159 The plaintiff was subsequently fired for creating a
disrespectful work environment.160 The court held that she as not protected
under the whistleblower’s act because she did not report it to a public body,
it was not a matter of public concern, and the government employer had
substantial reason to terminate her.161
In Foley v. Randolph, a fire chief in Randolph, Massachusetts held a
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press after a fire that claimed the lives of two children.162 The State Fire
Marshal, with the help of Foley and Sgt. Frank McGinn, held a press conference so that the press could inform the public of the incident.163 Shortly
after the press conference, the fire chief received a 15-day suspension without pay.164 He sued the city claiming that he was a citizen speaking on a
matter of public concern.165 The First Circuit upheld the suspension claiming that holding a press conference was part of his “official duties” as a fire
chief.166 All of these cases show the job duties threshold of the Garcetti
rule can lead to varying results for public employees and does not clearly
show what speech is protected under the First Amendment.
IV. LANE V. FRANKS: WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN
In Lane, the Court reiterated the well-settled principle that there is significant value in allowing public employee speech because they are often in
the best position to report government maleficence.167 Public employees
“are uniquely qualified to comment” on “matters concerning government
policies that are of interest to the public at large.”168 Moreover, the public’s
interest in “addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health [and]
safety…outweighs the government’s stake in [efficiency.]”169 Protecting
public employee speech is not about protecting the employee’s First
Amendment right, as much as it is about protecting “the public’s interest in
receiving informed opinion”170 about the government that it elects, funds,
and empowers.
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Despite the rhetoric of protecting the public interest, the Court wrote a
narrow opinion in Lane, which only applied to “[t]ruthful testimony under
oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties.”171
The decision gives an important exception to Garcetti and it is to be applauded. However, the Court has not corrected the problem of limiting employee speech based upon the nebulous definition of job duties. Now, the
Court will have to continue, on a case-by-case basis, to decide whether public employee speech that is a product of employment, and deals with matters of public concern, is protected.
1. IMPLIED RECOGNITION OF THE GARCETTI DILEMMA
In its analysis of the case, the Court in Lane did not start with the first
prong of the public employee speech doctrine created in Garcetti. Instead,
the Court first analyzed whether or not Lane’s testimony was a matter of
public concern. The Court focused on the importance of testimony in court
as “quintessential speech as a citizen that outweighs any obligation to his
employer.”172 The Court impliedly dismissed the primacy of the job duties
element by claiming that “Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply
relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the course
of public employment.”173 It seems as though the Court was creating an exception to circumvent the concept of “job duties,” which the lower courts
have extended to include speech that is a product of one’s employ.174
In Garcetti, Justice Stevens wrote in dissent: “[t]he notion that there is a
categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the
course of one’s employment is quite wrong.”175 Despite the Court’s interpretation in Lane, the rule of Garcetti is clear in that the determination of
speech protection is based upon whether the employee spoke as an employee at all.176 It does not matter if the person was in some degree speaking

171

Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
173
Id.
174
Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Weintraub v.
Board of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010)) (holding "speech can be made ‘pursuant to’ a public
employee’s job duties even though it is not required by, or included in, the employee’s job description,
or in request by the employer”).
175
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006).
176
See id.; see also Eric Marshall, Rescuing the Union Grievance from the Shoals of Garcetti: A Call
for the Return to Reason in Public Workplace Speech Jurisprudence, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 905, 907
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as a citizen.177 There is no balancing test: if the person was speaking as an
employee, at all, then there is no protection.178 But this dichotomy is false
as, more often than not, when an employee speaks about matters pertaining
to his or her job, then it is going to have some degree of public concern.
But too often, lower courts are using this ‘bright-line’ rule of whether the
employee was acting within his or her duties as the sole determinate as to
whether speech is protected. This rule assumes that a public employee
ceases to be a citizen when he or she is working, which goes against the
well-established principles of the public employee speech precedence.179 As
the facts of Lane illustrate, this dichotomy is rarely the case. It is difficult to
determine, or believe, that Lane fired the Representative solely because it
was within his job duties. It is just as reasonable that Lane believed the
Representative was wasting taxpayer money by committing fraud.
Moreover, “formal job description[s] often bear little resemblance to the
duties an employee actually is expected to perform.”180 The Court in Lane,
alluded to this when it spoke about the difference in speech pursuant to job
duties and speech that is a product of your job duties.181 The holding in
Lane is that the former is never protected and the latter can be protected.182
Yet, the majority gives no real distinction as to when public employee
speech is one and not the other. Presumably, the Court was unwilling to
elucidate this, as it is rarely clear because employees do so much work beyond their official job duties.183 In Lane, the Court should have given
clearer directions as to when speech derived from one’s employ is protected. Instead, all we know is that truthful testimony will be protected.184
2. SOLVING THE GARCETTI DILEMMA: A NEW PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE SPEECH TEST
Government agencies do need some control over their employees in or-
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der for the government to function efficiently.185 However, interest in efficient government should counterbalance, not outweigh the public’s interest
in receiving information about the government.186 When discussing matters
of public concern, employees should always have First Amendment protection.187 There was no previous constitutional basis for creating a categorical
line that does not protect a public employee when acting pursuant to his or
her official duties as the Court did in Garcetti.188 It is only speech that is not
of a matter of public concern or that poses a serious threat to the administration of the government, which should not be protected.189
The U.S. Supreme Court should modify the public employee speech doctrine and reconsider the Constitutional principles it is trying to promote.
The first prong of the public employee speech doctrine should return to: 1.)
whether the employee speaking on a matter of public concern.190 If the employee was not speaking on a matter of public concern, then there should be
no constitutional protection for the employee.191
If the employee was speaking on a matter of public concern, then the
next question should be: 2.) whether the employee speaking solely as a citizen.192 If the employee was speaking solely as a citizen, then the speech
should be protected unless there was articulable evidence that the speech
would do serious harm to the public interest in government operation. If the
employee was not speaking purely as a citizen, then there should be lesser
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scrutiny and the question becomes: 3) whether the government agency had
an important “justification for treating the employee differently from any
other member of the general public.”193
This new test would put the focus back on the “matter of public concern”
element, rather than the “citizen” element of the doctrine.194 Furthermore,
the test would still make a distinction between speech that is product of employ versus speech as a citizen, but speech that derives from employment
could receive protection. It would also remove the nebulous “job duties”
concept.195 The last prong of the test would reassert the Pickering balancing
test to allow for government efficiency. But, in this new balancing test, the
focus would be on the public’s interest in effective government versus the
agency’s self-interest in avoiding embarrassment or criticism.
Thus, in cases of citizen speech, the speech would have a preferred position over the management’s prerogative, unless the citizen speech would
harm the public interest in government efficacy.196 So, in the case of Andrew Shirvell and his attack on the University of Michigan president, there
is a strong argument that his homophobic speech, which he did as a citizen,
was disruptive to the public interest in the operation of that office, because
that office is charged with enforcing anti-discrimination laws.197
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Finally, in cases of speech that is a product of one’s employment, the interests will be balanced and the government would only need to show an
important justification to act.198 This would protect cases where employees
report government gross mismanagement, violations or public safety concerns. The speech will be protected as it outweighs the government’s managerial prerogative and promotes public interest in effective government.
The proposed test may also protect other speech that is critical of an employer that is a matter of public concern, if that is the sole grounds for dismissal (such as critiquing personnel decisions and funding).199
V. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment was created “to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the brining about of political and societal change desired by the
people.”200 Over the last, fifty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has deeply integrated this principle into its public employee speech doctrine.201 The
Court has consistently held that “[t]here is considerable value . . . in encouraging, rather than inhibiting, speech by public employees. For government employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they work.”202
In the last decade, the Garcetti rule has limited public employee speech
that pertains to matters of public concern as its expansive application did
not protect speech that was a product of job duties. This created a conflict
as the application of Garcetti erased the principles espoused in the public
employee speech cases. This dilemma was clearly illustrated in Lane, as he
felt that he was fired for truthfully testifying in court.203 The U.S. Supreme
Court agreed that such action would violate the First Amendment, so it created a narrow exception to Garcetti. But the Court did not go far enough.
The employee speech doctrine still relies on the nebulous concept of job duties. It still allows for lower courts to extend the definition of job duties to
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include speech that is a product of one’s employ (with the exception of subpoenaed testimony). It still does not protect truthful testimony if it is pursuant to one’s job duties.
This article argued that the Court should have gone beyond drafting such
a narrow exception. The Court should have refocused the emphasis of the
employee speech doctrine back toward whether or not the speech was a
matter of public concern. Then there should be two levels of scrutiny depending on whether the speech was made as a citizen or if it was a product
of employment. This would protect speech that serves the public interest,
while maintaining some prerogative for government management.
Ultimately, a public employee does works for a government and does
give up some rights in fulfilling his or her job duties.204 But, the employee’s duty should not be to the individual government manager or
agency. Instead, the public employee’s duty should be to the public to
whom that government answers.205
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